Union mifielder Jovan Lukic moves the ball in a game against New York City FC. (Courtesy of Philadelphia Union) Courtesy Philadelphia Union
The change in the Philadelphia Union from 2024 to 2025 was historic.
From nine wins in Jim Curtin’s final season, they won 20 games under Bradley Carnell.
From 37 points and 12th place in the Eastern Conference, they finished on 66, lifting the Supporters’ Shield and earning home-field advantage throughout the MLS Cup playoffs.
Those big changes arrived by more subtle means. The coaching succession paid big dividends, Carnell refining the principles of counterattacking soccer, though it wasn’t a wholesale stylistic change. The roster wasn’t overhauled, with strategic (some would say, overdue) upgrades. No new star necessarily emerged, though a handful of players continued steady growth.
So how to quantify the difference from 2024’s disaster to 2025’s triumph? Five stats that tell that tale of the Union’s Shield run.
The Union missed the playoffs in 2024 because they allowed too many goals. Fullest of stops.
They finished atop the standings this year largely because they allowed the fewest goals in the league.
The Union allowed 55 goals last year, sixth-most in the Eastern Conference. At 62 goals scored, they were third in the East.
This year, the Union reduced their GA figure to 35. Exclude the 7-0 loss to Vancouver, and the Union’s 28 would be two shy of the record they set in 2022 for the fewest allowed in a 34-game season at 26. The Union is one of 10 clubs in MLS history to allow 20 fewer goals from one season to the next over the same number of games. (That and a couple of other additional statistical oddities are here.)
Part of the reason why the Union found themselves in such dire straits in 2024 was conceding 15 goals from outside the box. That’s an off-the-charts number, one rarely quantified by most statistical programs. (For some context, Inter Miami led MLS in 2025 with 14 goals scored outside the box, and they have a short fellow you might have heard of.)
This year, the Union allowed three goals from outside the box:
Messi won the Golden Boot race with 29 goals. Evander finished fifth with 18 goals and third in MLS in combined goal contributions at 33. Martinez was eighth with 17 goals. If you’re going to allow goals outside the box, those are the guys you’re relatively OK with beating you. They’re not, say, Alexandros Katranis.
Some of the change is rotten luck last year. Some of it is a lack of goalkeeping depth and midfield structure. By any means, the Union kept 14 clean sheets (plus two games in which the only concession was a penalty kick). Their 19 goals allowed from open play tied Minnesota for least in MLS.
Vancouver was a house of horrors for the Union, for no one more than Andrew Rick. On that day at BC Place, the backup goalie was blistered for seven goals, two from the penalty spot, on 5.9 expected goals. None, in the final calculus, could you really qualify as his fault.
To that point, the Union’s goalkeeping stats looked like this:
The final tallies read thusly:
Rick in 2024 allowed 12 goals on 10.9 xG, a PSxG-GA per 90 of minus-0.02. (Oliver Semmle, despite his bad rep, was plus-0.02 last year.) You want to be in the plus, indicating that you’re stopping more shots than the xG indicates you should. Rick last year was underwater. This year, he was average before Vancouver, which is exactly what the Union needed him to be.
Blake returned to his All-Star form after injuries hampered him in 2024. That was significant. But so was Rick developing into a reliable if not spectacular backup at age 19.
The numbers tell his side of the story. Just as vital was that the Union allowed 10.9 xG in six games with him in net last year and 16.9 in his 14 appearances this year (it’s 11,0 in 13 appearances pre-Vancouver).
Midfield is the major tactical area of change from 2024 to 2025, in terms of personnel and structure. Here’s one way to quantify that:
Jack McGlynn, Jose Martinez and Leon Flach played the equivalent of 64.3 90s last year (80 appearances). The trio accounted for 72 progressive carries and 410 progressive passes. That’s 1.12 carries and 6.38 progressive passes per 90.
Danley Jean Jacques and Jovan Lukic played 55.3 90s (63 appearances) this year. They accounted for 64 progressive carries (1.16 per 90) and 304 progressive passes (5.50 per 90).
In essence, the Union are getting roughly the same facilitating thrust through the middle of the park from two players in 2025 as they did from three in 2024. They’re doing it with similar defensive metrics, since last year the strength of Flach and the liability of McGlynn mostly canceled out. And because two guys did that job in the 4-2-2-2 as opposed to three in the 4-4-2 diamond, Jean Jacques and Lukic have four creative players ahead of them to generate attacks, not three.
Structurally, the twin sixes cut down the room in the middle of the pitch where many of those goals outside the box originated last year, on either side of a single six.
Without McGlynn, traded to Houston in February, the central midfield generated fewer chances: he was second on the Union with 55 key passes last year. But the 2024 trio generated 1.18 key passes/90. Jean Jacques and Lukic are at 0.94 per 90. Add a second 10 in front of them and the Union are still ahead.
Jakob Glesnes was not good in 2024. His season was bookended by mind-boggling own goals in Costa Rica and Chester on Decision Day. At 30, it was fair to wonder if the two-time All-Star and 2022 Defender of the Year was in one-way decline.
This year, Glesnes stopped the slide. Part of it was feeling healthy again: He started 102 consecutive games before sports hernia surgery at the end of 2023 that he rushed back from in less than four weeks but that caused lingering pain through 2024. Having only two competitions to focus on has helped him recover between games.
A year-by-year comparison doesn’t show a ton of variance. But a few things stand out:
He’s staying put: Glesnes had 18 progressive carries in 2024. He averaged 29 the last three years. He attempted four take-ons all year after an average of 11 the last three years. He’s not pushing the action with the ball and less likely to be caught out.
He’s fouling more: Glesnes committed 43 fouls in 2024. He had 43 combined the last two years in more than double the minutes. That accounts for 10 yellow cards (and two accumulation suspensions) after just 11 cards from 2022-24. He’s ending plays more decisively and accepting the punishment for it.
He’s courting contact less: That seems counterintuitive but … Glesnes has attempted only 46 tackles on dribblers this season. That’s way down from 60 last year. That was a consequence of him getting caught out a lot and having to scramble.
Add it all up: He’s staying at home more, he’s diving out less and he’s taking the sure thing of ending a play instead of allowing it to carry on.
The Union’s counter-pressing system is all about where the ball is. You want the opponent to have it in areas of the field that, when dispossessed, can lead to chances. The Union want possession in the middle of the pitch to control the game and defend forward.
In 2024, per data from WhoScored, 28 percent of the Union’s actions came in their own third, 11th most in the league. They were 17th in percentage of actions in the final third at 29.
This year, they have the fewest actions in their own third (23 percent) and the second-most in the attacking third (33 percent).
This is a measure of field tilt. The Union controlled games by dictating where the action was. Part of that is not conceding as early – the Union allowed only two goals in the first 15 minutes of games, as opposed to six last year. More actions further from your own goal leads to lower probability of conceding. Controlling where the opponent has the ball is a way the Union assert control over games without needing to have possession.
